One important part of democratic consolidation in Indonesia is to finalize security sector reform, especially the reorganization of the National Police.

While no major questions are being asked about the progress of reform within the Indonesian Military (TNI) and state intelligence bodies, there has been a public debate about the need to amend Law No. 2/2002 on the National Police — especially in light of the ongoing conflict between the police and the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK).

The fact that two presidents who were both directly elected by the people — first Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and now Joko Widodo — have had to face the same problem, provides a strong indication that something has to be done.

The president should be able to command the entire system of law enforcement. If the president has no effective control over law enforcement agencies, there is a danger that the state’s credibility will be jeopardized not only in the eyes of its own people but also among foreign investors.

There is no doubt that Indonesia has made a lot of progress in the area of security sector reform. We now have strong legal umbrellas under which defense and security institutions operate. However, as far the National Police is concerned, the institutional arrangement is quite different.

Article 3 of Law No. 34/2004 clearly stipulates that in regards to the mobilization of military personnel the TNI reports to the president and that defense policies and strategies should be coordinated by the Defense Ministry. Thus, the president — through his defense minister — must make sure that military policies are in line with his vision and priorities.

However, there is no such mechanism in place to ensure presidential control over the National Police, and the president is also not allowed to interfere in law enforcement efforts being undertaken by police.

This is exactly the reason why Joko has had a hard time in reconciling the National Police and the KPK, and why the president appears to be powerless in stopping the criminalization of the anti-graft body. The situation has become even more complicated because the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P), the ruling party, has refused to support the president on this matter.

It goes without saying that Indonesia needs a strong and professional National Police force to tackle threats against national security, including transnational terrorism, religious radicalism, drug trafficking, human trafficking, arms smuggling and separatist movements.

But considering its key position within the law enforcement system, there must be an embedded institutional guarantee that policies of the National Police are line with the grand strategy of the president as the nation’s top executive. And this can only be done if there is a political will to amend Law No. 2/2002 by placing the National Police under the control of a ministry responsible for domestic security affairs.

Under the current system, which allows the National Police to freely set out its policy plans, the institution can always hide behind statements that whatever it wants to do, is done in the name of law enforcement. In that case, even the president cannot interfere.

It is up to the House of Representatives to consider amendments to Law No. 2/2002. To be sure, there will be strong resistance from the National Police. However, if Indonesia truly wants to improve the quality of its law enforcement system, the first step is to reform the National Police and to make sure it is willing to operate under effective presidential control.

For the sake of good governance and the consolidation of democracy, we cannot afford to have an institution with the authority to arrest people without a sound legal basis. If we fail to change the status quo, we will keep encountering the same problem in the future and an effective law enforcement system will remain elusive.

Aleksius Jemadu is dean of the School of Government and Global Affairs at Pelita Harapan University (UPH) in Karawaci.

The post Aleksius Jemadu: Police Should Be Placed Under Ministerial Control appeared first on The Jakarta Globe.

China’s relationship with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations as a regional entity has never been stable. It is like the two lovers who have to carefully navigate through their times of intimacy and trouble. While in terms of mutual trade and investment they are indispensable to one another and therefore seek to sustain regional stability, the situation is much more complicated when it comes to issues like territorial conflict and its resolution in the South China Sea.

Recently China’s Foreign Ministry spokesman Hong Lei said that Beijing was “extremely concerned” with the fact that the issue of territorial conflict in the South China Sea was addressed at all during the Asean Summit in Kuala Lumpur.

There are at least three reasons why China has come up with such objection.

First, China has always rejected the idea that it has to deal with Asean in resolving the territorial conflict in the South China Sea despite the fact that four Asean members — Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam — are claimants to the disputed territory. China insists that it has no conflict with Asean as a whole and therefore prefers to have one-on-one dialogues with the claimants.

Second, the course of events in the South China Sea gives us a strong impression that Beijing has reached a point of no return in building physical infrastructures on disputed islands in the belief that such aggressive maneuvers will ultimately compel all those who oppose China’s territorial claims to accept its de facto control over disputed areas.

Based on this policy, China has continued to make rapid progress in building a military airstrip in the Spratly Islands. At the end of the day, Beijing seems to tacitly assume that any international negotiations to resolve the territorial conflict in the South China Sea will have to take into account the status quo, including its territorial control.

Third, Beijing is very much aware of the fact that in dealing with other territorial claimants, it has to rely on its own capability while its opponents — like the Philippines and Vietnam — have the tendency to use the support of the United States and Japan, whose strategic aims in the South China Sea are to prevent any kind of unilateral domination over one of the most important global passages for maritime trade.

As a matter of fact, when Japan’s Prime Minister Shinzo Abe visited Washington recently he used the opportunity to reaffirm his nation’s traditional alliance with the United States, by responding to what he called Beijing’s aggressive behavior in the South China and East China seas.

It is now clear that as far as Asean’s relationship with China is concerned this regional entity has to reconcile two important strategic objectives which will ultimately affect the future prospect of its regional integration.

On the one hand, Asean has to maintain unity among its members in order to maintain their enthusiasm for the implementation of the Asean Economic Community. On the other hand, without China’s economic support such regional integration might not accomplish much.

Asean simply cannot deny the fact that China is too important to be ignored — as a huge market and an abundant source of investment.

Although the reconciliation of the two strategic objectives is not going to be easy, Asean should find ways how to proceed further with its plan of promoting the acceptance of the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea.

Beijing has good reasons to maintain its good relationship with Asean, whose moderate and peace-oriented policies are more acceptable in China’s eyes than a combative and confrontational approach led by Japan and the United States.

On top of that, China needs Asean to strengthen its legitimacy and acceptability as a continental leader in Asia. In the context of its historical and psychological competition with Japan, China always looks at Asean as a close friend, considering that in the past both were victims of Japan’s militarization and occupation before and during World War II.

As long as both Asean and China are aware of their strategic interdependence, it should be possible to continue with the series of talks related to the establishment of a Code of Conduct in the South China Sea.

Any kind of unilateral effort to transform this territorial dispute into a show of power will only lead to unnecessary and dangerous tensions which will ultimately destroy the current momentum of economic growth in the region.

Aleksius Jemadu is dean of the School of Government and Global Affairs at Pelita Harapan University (UPH) in Karawaci.

The post Aleksius Jemadu: China, Asean Are Strategically Interdependent appeared first on The Jakarta Globe.

Tokyo. The euro struggled to pick up in Asia on Friday ahead of Greece’s last-minute funding talks with its European creditors, while the dollar was supported by expectations US interest rates will go up this year.

The single European currency was at $1.1363 and 135.15 yen in Tokyo trade, compared with $1.1365 and 135.18 yen in New York afternoon but well down from $1.1415 and 135.49 yen earlier Thursday in Asia.

The dollar edged down to 118.89 yen from 118.94 yen in US trade.

Eyes are on events in Brussels, where the finance ministers from the euro zone’s 19 members will consider Greece’s application for a loan extension without the painful austerity measures it says have hurt the economy.

Germany rejected the request for an extra six months of cash, fueling fears Greece will run out soon after its current bailout finishes at the end of the month.

However, hopes of a breakthrough have increase after a Greek government source said German Chancellor Angela Merkel held talks with Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras by telephone on Thursday in a “positive climate”.

Also, German vice chancellor Sigmar Gabriel said that while Athens’ offer fell short, “it must be used as a starting point for negotiations”.

National Australia Bank said there was nothing definitive at this stage but pointed to the “rather legalistic construction” of the Greek request letter.

It “seems to express a wish to comply with its existing conditions or at least work toward a solution rather than blanket rejection of completely re-writing the conditions”, the bank said in a note.

The dollar has recovered from losses that came after Federal Reserve minutes suggested an interest rate hike could be put back, as a bigger-than-forecast decrease in jobless claims reinforced belief that US economic growth is outpacing global peers.

“It’s a lay-up — everybody wants to be here in the US,” Michael Levas, founder and chief investment officer of Olympian Capital Management said in an interview in New York. “Everybody feels safety and security in owning US paper, whether it’s US government bonds or the dollar.”

Neil Jones, head of hedge fund sales at Mizuho Bank in London, said “a rate increase by the Fed may not be immediate, but 2015 is still a possibility”.

“Any dollar weakness may be temporary,” he told Bloomberg News.

Agence France-Presse

The post Euro Under Pressure in Asian Trading on Greek Jitters appeared first on The Jakarta Globe.